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NOTES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-CUSTODY JUDGMENTS-ESSENTIAL
VALIDITY-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

Husband and wife were natives and domiciliaries of Wisconsin; however, the wife left Wisconsin with the children and
moved to Ohio, establishing domicile there. Subsequently, the
father obtained a divorce in Wisconsin. The mother in Ohio
was given notice, but she did not enter an appearance in the
suit. The custody of the children was awarded to the father,
who then brought them back to Wisconsin. Thereafter he permitted the children to visit their mother in Ohio. When she
refused to surrender them, the father petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus. The state courts of Ohio decided that the Wisconsin decree was binding on the mother under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution. The mother
obtained a reversal from the United States Supreme Court.1
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
Mr. Justice Burton, writing for the majority, which included
Chief Justice Vinson and the Justices Black and Douglas, found
"it unnecessary to determine the children's legal domicile because, even if it be with their father, that does not give Wisconsin, certainly as against Ohio, the personal jurisdiction that it
must have in order to deprive their mother of her personal right
to their immediate possession."'2 (Italics supplied.) Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in a concurring opinion stated exactly what he
understood the Court to be deciding and not deciding in the case:
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Ohio to
accept the Wisconsin disposition of the children and not that
Ohio would be precluded from recognizing it; Ohio could give
effect to it without offending due process of law.
Mr. Justice Jackson, joined by Mr. Justice Reed, dissented
to the entire theory of the majority and concurring opinions. He
contended that the domicile of the children was in Wisconsin
and that this fact, plus the domicile of the father, should be
1. The lower courts had based judgment on the following reasons: (1)
the county court in Wisconsin in the divorce proceedings on substituted
service on the mother had power or control over the children although both
mother and children were in Ohio; (2) during the period of time between
the filing of the divorce petition and the decree, the children were "domiciled"
in Wisconsin; (3) the mother's change of domicile did not affect that of the
children although they were with her because domicile of a minor child is
that of the father. Anderson v. May, 157 Ohio St. 436, 105 N.E.2d 648 (1952);
91 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 358 (1952).
2. 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

VOL. XIV

sufficient under the theory of Williams v. North Carolina8 to
support a custody decree and entitle it to full faith and credit.
Mr. Justice Minton in a separate dissent pointed out that the
judgment appeared valid on its face, that the mother had not

questioned its validity in any of the pleadings, and that therefore
Ohio had been bound to give it full faith and credit.'
In Halvey v. Halvey,!5 the Supreme Court had expressly
reserved two questions which, if answered, might go a long way
toward clearing up the present dissension as to what constitutes
the jurisdictional basis of a custody decree which must be recognized by sister states. The questions were: (1) can a court render a valid custody decree where the child is out of the state
with one of its parents at the time the decree is rendered and
(2) is the parent who is outside the state bound by the custody
decree where there is only constructive service on him? Both
of these questions were before the Court in the instant case.
The first question remains unanswered, while the second was
answered in the negative.
It is submitted that this decision falls short of defining the
basis for jurisdiction in custody actions. In turning its attention
to the personal rights of the mother, the Court went counter
the usual supposition that custody concerns a determination of
status, which, under the rules of conflict of laws, is normally
reserved to the state of domicile of the party whose status is
at issue.
The oldest rule is that the forum
the court of the child's domicile.0 On
line of cases has held that "residence"
give the court the power to determine

for the custody decree is
the other hand, a recent
of the child is enough to
the child's status. 7 Such

3. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
4. If in the pleas before the Supreme Court, the mother did not question
the validity of the decree, it would seem that the court raised the question
of its own accord; and as Justice Minton pointed out, the court had no right
to question whether the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit.

5. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
6. Larson v. Larson, 190 Minn. 489, 252 N.W. 329 (1934); Griffin v. Griffin,
95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac. 598 (1920); Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce
Suits, 7 CORN. L.Q. 1 (1921); Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. OF CM. L. REv. 42 (1940). Contra: Stansbury, Custody and
Maintenance Across State Lines, 10 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 819 (1944).
. 7. De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896);
Girtman v. Ricketson, 221 La. 691, 60 So.2d 88 (1952), 27 TULANE L. REV. 361

(1953); Haynie v. Hudgins, 122 Miss. 838, 85 So. 99 (1920); Boor v. Boor, 241
Iowa 973, 43 N.W.2d 155 (1950); Sheehy v. Sheehy, 88 N.H. 223, 186 Atl. 1
(1936); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925); Guardians for
Wilkins, 146 Pa. 585, 23 Atl. 325 (1892); Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489, 208 S.W.2d

876, 4 A.L.R.2d 1 (1948); Note, 24 HARV. L. Rv. 142 (1910).

1954]

NOTES

holdings are premised on the rationale that the rules of domicile
are too technical, and that in reality the state in which the child
is actually present has the greater interest in its welfare. In addition, it has more knowledge of the needs and present living conditions of the child.8
The instances in which the courts have focused attention on
the rights of the parents comprise a small minority of custody
cases.9 The majority opinion does this, and the result is that
under it the custody decree acquires the aspects of a personal
judgment against the parent, thus making personal jurisdiction
a requirement at least for compelling interstate recognition. The
majority, by holding that Wisconsin's decree does not have extraterritorial effect (since Wisconsin did not have personal jurisdiction over the mother when the decree was rendered), seems
to say that the decree is valid in Wisconsin, but not recognizable
in Ohio. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion says
he understands the majority opinion to mean that Ohio can
recognize the Wisconsin decree if it chooses, but that Ohio is not
compelled to recognize it. Either interpretation runs counter to
the language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause which requires
the valid judgments of one state of the union to be accepted by
its sister states, 10 and this is the position taken by Mr. Justice
Jackson in his dissent. As a valid judgment has been understood
to be one which meets the requirements of the Due Process
Clause," both the majority opinion and the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter imply an introduction of separate standards for essential validity and for recognition under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. It would seem that Mr. Justice Jackson's
position that custody actions can only be brought in the state in
which the child is domiciled, if adopted by the Court, would
8. Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Across State Lines, 10 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 819 (1944). Therein the author contends that this is the more
realistic and workable rule; although the majority of the cases support the
domicile rule, in all of those cases except one, the domicile and residence did

in fact coincide.
9. Breene v. Breene, 51 Colo. 342, 117 Pac. 1000 (1911); Stephens v.
Stephens, 53 Idaho 427, 24 P.2d 52 (1933); Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285
Pac. 606, 72 A.L.R. 425 (1930); May v. May, 233 App. Div. 519, 253 N.Y. Supp.
606 (1st Dep't 1931); Commouwealth v. Rahal, 48 Pa. D. & C. 568, 25 Erie Co.
L.J. 241 (1942); Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W.Va. 124, 81 S.E. 706 (1914).

10. Although Mr. Frankfurter stated that the majority was holding that
Ohio could recognize the judgment if it wished to, neither he nor the majority cited any authority showing that the terms of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Federal Constitution are anything but mandatory.
11. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT or LAWS § 429, comment (1934).
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furnish the rule most likely to prevent, in his words, the reduc2
tion of "the law of custody to a rule of seize-and-run.'1
Helen M. Wimmer
CONFLICT OF LAWS-JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENTSCONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE IN TORT ACTION ARISING

OUTSIDE THE STATE

Suit in New York arose out of a death resulting from the
crash of an airliner operated by defendant corporation. A New
York statute provided that service of process could be made upon
the Secretary of State as agent for nonresident owners of aircraft for the purposes of litigation arising out of accidents of
any aircraft "which has landed at or departed from any airfield
in this state."' The airliner was on a scheduled flight from
New York to California and crashed in California. Defendant
was served with process in New York in accordance with the
statute. The application of the statute under these facts was
challenged as a violation of due process. The lower court ruled
that all the requirements were met. 2 On appeal, held, the statute
was unconstitutional insofar as it was applied to accidents or
collisions which occurred out of state, as the police power of the
state may not be projected -beyond its territorial boundaries.
Peters v. Robin Airlines, 281 App. Div. 903, 120 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d
Dep't 1953).

The United States Supreme Court in 1878 in the landmark
case of Pennoyer v. Neff' held that constructive service upon a
nonresident defendant is ineffective to support a personal judg-

ment. The court limited the decision by expressly excluding any
opinion as to the right of states to require the appointment of
agents for service of process by nonresidents "entering into a
partnership or association within its limits" for actions arising
out of such business.4 Nevertheless, that case represents the high
water mark in protecting nonresident defendants. The principles
of Pennoyer v. Neff have by necessity undergone modifications.
It has long been well settled that nonresident corporations
doing business within a state are subject to the jurisdiction of its
12. 345 U.S. 528, 542 (1953).
1. N.Y. GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 250 (Cum. Supp. 1952).
2. Peters v. Robin Airlines, 118 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).

4. Id. at 735.

